

RESEARCH PROPOSAL:

**THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS  
AS A MODEL FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE**

We in Europe are facing today a critical period in the process of closer unification. The war in Ukraine and the growth of internal centrifugal forces put European peoples in front of difficult choices. The *de facto* creation of a common deficit and debt, the indirect military involvement into a war close to its borders, the call for the creation of a common defence, the financial commitment to the reconstruction of Ukraine after the war, the search for a new policy to tackle the question of illegal immigration, the quest by the European Parliament for rebalancing the decision-making process with the Council, pose serious challenges to the survival of the Union.

For the first time in the process of European integration, it is possible today to notice a discrepancy between the 'material' and the 'legal' Constitution. It seems therefore plausible to argue that a revision of the treaties which make the current Constitution of Europe is unavoidable. An interdisciplinary and institutionalized examination among scholars on the present state of the European constitutional process, its possible evolution, and its potential application to global governance, could contribute to place the current debate on the future of the Union and international relations on more solid basis. Although the European constituent moment failed, the Union has nevertheless managed to legitimize itself through the affirmation of an identity synthesizing democratic values and a citizenship status for Europeans.

**I. The nature of European constitutionalism**

The present European Union does not constitute a real state. It is in fact an embryonic form of state, and nothing is as difficult as creating a new state on an area already covered by many states. At any moment, until the end, the undertaking can fail.

The fact that the EU does not depend, as Kalypso Nicolaïdis first pointed out, on the existence of a single European *demoi*, but on a plurality of *demoi* which voluntarily surrendered part of their sovereign powers to common legislative, executive and judiciary institutions, characterizes the EU as a *democracy* in the making, a constituent power in progress. In fact, the process of democratization of EU institutions succeeded to establish a horizontal relationships between citizens, organizations and institutions from the different *demoi* on issues of their collective governance. An example of this horizontal relationship is the EU's system of policy coordination through committees and agencies. Other examples of EU's *democratic* mechanism are the interaction between the EU agencies and their national counterparts, and the so-called 'yellow card' or Early Warning Mechanism introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, which provides an institutionalized network which enables many *demoi* to deliberate together on substantive EU legislation. The European institutions offer the most advanced example of functional supranational constitutionalism, or of a supranational constitutional authority founded on a plurality of national constitutional identities. In the process of European

integration, constitutionalism and democracy as empirical ideas and normative ideals have become synonymous with legitimate governance.

Since the Treaties of Rome, the European Court of Justice played an important role in the constitutionalization of the European Community/Union, transforming the perception of the existing treaties into that of a 'material' Constitution. This process directly influenced regional integration, the institutionalization of norms, institutional expansion, the effectiveness of European laws, the creation and maintenance of the borders of the union, and the creation of social solidarity. However, this process took place through the back door, with the progressive creation of a supranational legal order *ex proprio vigore* (i.e. a coherent and systematic corpus of legal rules with autonomous validity, coinciding with a territorially limited social and political entity), initially intended to support the creation of a common economic free-trade area. As mentioned by the ECJ for the first time in case C 157/21, "the values contained in Article 2 TEU have been identified and are shared by the Member States. They define the very identity of the European Union as a common legal order" (February 2022, Poland against EP and Council, para 145).

The set of mechanisms, institutions, rules, and practices that make up the current Constitution of the European Union have not in fact been endorsed by a wide public debate. National parliaments are the primary arena for public debate about the Union when asked to ratify decisions taken at the European level. The growing politicization of European governance brought about a party-political polarization, establishing a link between two dimensions of debate: the discursive justification and party-political contestation of decision-making practice within the Union.

The question of European constitutionalism cannot be reduced however to the mere question of a political mechanism. It is rather an aspect of the fundamental question, namely how to manage the transition from national societies based on the values of centralization/devolution and nationalism, to a multi/supranational society based on democratic practices, community values, and cosmopolitanism. A constitutional model for Europe should take into consideration the democratic ideals and constitutional cultures existing within the Union, studying both the relationship between diverse traditions and identities, as well as the possibilities of integrating existing political interests into the common interest of a European entity, both problems being related to the question of how sovereignty is to be defined and allocated. The European Constitution would thus constitute the first model of constitutional pluralism.

The functionalist strategy of promoting spill over from one economic sector to another has now ended to induce a steady progress towards a federal union. However, unanticipated results of integration through law have produced over-regulation, and an institutional framework which is too rigid to allow significant policy and institutional innovations. Thus, integration by spill over has produced sub-optimal policies, and, in the eyes of the public, a steady loss of legitimacy by European institutions. Both the functionalist approach and the classic Community method seem therefore to have reached their limits. No further progress may be expected applying these methods because of, firstly, a lack of popular support and democratic legitimacy, and, secondly, because they are unable to deliver the public goods which European citizens expect to receive from European governance. However, the transition from a mainly intergovernmental decisional level to a democratic and federal one will neither be automatic nor painless. It seems that only a constitutional moment can achieve that goal.

If the final goal of the European constitutional process is to create a new model of supranational democracy, based on the progressive formation of a single *demos*, it is not just a question of governance, which in itself could be autocratic or democratic *sui generis*, but the question of the extension of democracy beyond the borders of the nation-state (the fusion of nation with the state). The completion of the process of democratization of the European Union would thus mark the historical end of nationalism (the ideology of the nation-state), of the ‘natural’ political division of Europe in nation-states, and the beginning of the supranational course of European history. A process inaugurated indeed in 1979 with the first elections of the European Parliament, which marked the right of self-determination – applied for the first time in European history not to divide existing political entities but to unite – by the nascent European *demos* to constitute itself as a new political subject.

If, on the empirical level, it is justified on the basis of a negative principle, that is to say the denial of the nation as the model of the political organization of human societies, on the cultural level it comes to assume a positive and universal historical significance – it will be the first example of democratic control of the supranational course of history. This is the historical meaning of the European Revolution, which should be put in relation with the other great revolutionary actions of human history. The definitive overcoming of the political division of humanity into national states and the creation of the universal realm of law has found in fact in Europe the historical terrain of its first affirmation because Europe was the first region of the world in which the national levees fell under the road roller of the Nazi armies.

The universal historical significance – beyond the merely regional – of the European Revolution lies in relation to the fact of its being exportable – as it was for the other great European revolutions – and therefore progressively extensible to include all the states of the planet. The historical novelty of the European Revolution is represented by the emergence, in this region of the world, of a post-national political identity, complementary to national political identities. It was in fact only in the context of the European Union that this new historical fact fully emerged. The notion of democracy beyond the borders of the national state represents a challenge to the same representative model applied within the national state. In this process, the nascent European civil society plays a vital role in the attempt to democratize the European Union’s institutions and its decision-making process.

## **II. The European values and identity**

As a matter of fact the founding values of European civilization, such as political ideologies (liberalism, democracy, socialism and nationalism), the way of producing (capitalism), the intellectual and moral paradigms (philosophy, science, civil and social rights), have been tested for the first time in history in this region of the world, and from here exported on the planetary scale, gradually coming to represent a universal model of behavior. They have become the constitutive values of the identity of the modern man. In this lies the irresistible strength of the European magnet. The values produced in this part of the world are today the common heritage of mankind and constitute a universally accepted parameter for measuring the degree of cultural, political, and moral development of a people. European thought – both as self-consciousness and as descriptive and

prescriptive knowledge – has universalized, on the waves first of the sea and then of the ether, filling the voids of non-thought.

Values are defined historically – that is to say, they are inscribed throughout history, which makes them progressively thinkable and concretely achievable from time to time. The European Revolution would represent the crowning and completion of the democratic revolution. By suppressing the duty of exclusive loyalty to the nation, which is already dead in deeds, and thus restoring to man the clear conscience of his belonging to humanity, of which nationalism, produced by the national state, had deprived it, the European Revolution would operate a global rethinking of the system of categories through which the world and the human condition were thought of. The central problem of our time no longer seems then to be connected only to the question of achieving a higher degree of freedom, equality or social justice, but to that of organizing peaceful and constitutional relations between nations. If we therefore accept the point of view that the historical novelty of our time coincides with the question of the political integration of mankind, then it seems plausible to maintain that the European constitutional process has a meaning for the rest of the world.

In this regard, it should be reiterated that the profound reason for being of the European Union does not lie in the defence of a specific cultural, racial, or religious identity – as if to continue to mark the superiority of the white man of Christian religion on the rest of mankind – but in a specific method for the resolution of conflicts between states. The ‘civilizing’ mission of Europe towards the rest of the world has been, since the second half of the twentieth century, that of exporting peace as a value in itself, and it being concretely feasible, after having exported, for the entire period after the fall of Rome, war as an instrument of power politics among states. The European ‘mission’ in external relations is in fact well described in art. 21 TEU: “The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development, and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law”. Among these inspiring principles we can identify multilateralism, the supranational approach, and the very idea of having former enemies becoming partners through shared projects and endeavors.

Moreover, after being part of the problem in the first place, nowadays we can witness the ‘green’ mission of a united Europe to the rest of the world. The EU can be considered a real frontrunner in the promotion and implementation of environmental protection and some other aspects of sustainability. This is confirmed, among other things, by the European Green Deal, which aims to position the EU as a global leader. Although it is not credible to claim that there is no room for improvement in the existing EU approach, its comparison with most of the industrialized countries of the world shows that EU standards can in principle be considered a benchmark.

As for the concept of European identity, it is wrongly held that it is not well defined, or that it is identified by the sum of national identities. National identities are the product of national ideologies, and the age of nationalisms has been only a brief interlude in European history. Its roots are on the surface, while those of European unity on the contrary, are very deep. The European identity was born on the shores of the Aegean Sea and has progressively been defined, through successive re-elaborations – of which the Renaissance and the Enlightenment represented the highest forms – as

the identity of humans as such, of the universal man, citizen of the world. They have been the national identities that have progressively defined themselves differentiating – even in antagonism – with respect to this universal identity. For a curious cunning of reason, or heterogenesis of the ends, the European identity has progressively become universal thanks to antagonistic identities. Sinking its roots deep, this identity has always been stronger than its negations, and has gradually strengthened itself in the struggle that has seen it as opposed to the historically determined attempts to deny it. In the historical process of its universalization, European identity has thus used its opposite – be it embodied in historical figures or materialized in institutions – to define itself with ever greater clarity and strength.

The specific contribution offered by national identities to the progressive formation of a common European identity lies in the historical realization of its specific aspects. Let's think here, for example, to the question of the *laicite* of the state, which found its first form of historical realization in France, to the question of human dignity, which found the historical ground for its affirmation in Germany, or to the principle of tolerance, which started the process of its progressive universalization from the United Kingdom.

### III. The European model and global governance

One can ask if the United Nations is that embryo of world government able to transform previous war areas into areas of internal peace. The answer can only be negative. In fact, the UN failed so far to restrain economic nationalism, to lower tariffs and other trade barriers, and to achieve universal disarmament . There are four fundamental reasons why the UN or any system based on the alliance of sovereign states is doomed to failure. The first is that each member of the Assembly, as a delegate of their own state, tends to consider every question from the national point of view and not according to the common good of mankind as a whole. The Council and the Assembly are, in essence, diplomatic conferences, with the task of mediating between the potentially conflicting national points of view.

The second reason is linked to the fact that neither the Council nor the Assembly can exercise direct and real power as they are deprived of their own financial resources, and are not able to demand the obedience of a single citizen, and nor do they possess an army. Subsidies and quotas come from the member states, which are sovereign and act separately on the basis of their own benefit. The decisions of the Council must be taken unanimously, not by a majority, because of the danger of secession.

The third reason is that neither the Council nor the Assembly are in a position to subject international treaties to revision, modify tariffs, and redefine the political structure of the world, except with the consent of the states involved, and this is manifestly impossible when strategic considerations are involved.

The fourth is that the only weapons the UN possesses to produce changes in the *status quo* – or its restoration, in the face of unilateral attempts to subvert it – are sanctions or threats of both economic and military sanctions. In reality, the UN, as in the past with the League of Nations, is not a system of peace, but only a system for making war an instrument of collective instead of national policy.

More than the UN, today there is the so-called G7 to form an embryo of world government. This embryo is today autocratic. It is essentially the attempt by the United States to associate the other 6 major powers forming the Atlantic System in the perpetuation of world hegemony since 1945.

The twentieth century appears in fact as a century divided exactly in half. If the first half had been marked by two world wars, which put an end to European hegemony in international politics, its second half has been characterized by a long period of truce, during which no regional conflict widened directly involving the main powers. It is plausible, therefore, to identify in the signing of the Atlantic Charter in August 1941 the real watershed of the twentieth century. If it were a simple military-economic agreement – the United States had already openly deployed alongside the United Kingdom in the fight against Nazism – it would have been exhausted with the collapse of Germany. If instead it were an alliance to contain the Bolshevik threat, it would have disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since 1991, the policy of an Atlantic union has instead extended to include an increasing number of states, and has been reinforced, including a common army, integrated economic and financial institutions, and a market on the threshold of acquiring common rules. The signing of the Atlantic Charter initiated, around the Anglo-American nucleus, an apparently unstoppable process of economic and political integration among states which over the four previous centuries had permanently resorted to war in order to resolve conflicts among themselves, which the simple means of diplomacy were not able to prevent. It brought about the enlargement of the sphere of influence of the English-speaking countries on world economics and politics alike.

The Atlantic Alliance, rather than representing the passing of the torch – whose delay cost Europe and the world two global conflicts – marked the continuity, the enlargement, and the deepening of Anglo-Saxon hegemony in world politics. Such hegemony has, since the seventeenth century, been able to prevent the unification of Continental Europe by means of violence by the strongest Continental power – Spain with Charles V and Philip II, France with Louis XIV and Napoleon I, Germany with Wilhelm II and Hitler, and Russia with Stalin and Brezhnev. It encouraged, on the contrary, Europe's economic and political unification through peaceful and constitutional means with the building of supranational institutions. According to this perspective, we did not therefore have a British century – the Nineteenth – and an American century – the Twentieth – but four centuries of Anglo-Saxon supremacy. During this time, we witnessed the affirmation of the national principle – an expression of the Continental political tradition – and its overcoming through its opposites, the functional and federal principles, expression of the insular political tradition.

The challenge that confronts us today appears to transform this embryo of world government from autocratic to *demoicratic*. This is possible – of course on the theoretical level – through a transition from American leadership to equal partnership by its members, and the application to this directory of the functionalist method that has been applied to post-war Europe. By studying the aspects of power and the dynamics of the process of European unification, it is possible to produce schemes also applicable not only to Atlantic integration, but also to other processes of regional integration that are developing in Asia, South and North America and Africa.

However, the application of the European constitutional model to the G7 could be successful only at the condition of it being open for membership, constituting what Albert Einstein would have called 'partial world government'.

The precedent represented by Russia's brief membership within what then became the G8 can, in this regard, be illuminating as to the character of the G7. The fundamental reason for the ousting of Russia from the G8 is not to be blamed – as erroneously believed today – just on its neo-imperialist policy in Ukraine with the annexation of Crimea, but on the fact that liberal democracy in Russia is not yet fully rooted according to the classical model. The otherwise incomprehensible absence of China from the G7 depends on the fact that, after introducing capitalism as a method of production, and socialism as a form of organization of the state, it still seems very far from having assimilated the principles of liberal democracy on which the political culture of the members of the G7 is based.

The ability to exercise global governance – that is to say to address and resolve the main conflicts that exist today on a global scale – does not depend exclusively on the economic and strategic role that a country exerts on a planetary level, but on the presence, within it, of a political culture that makes it similar to the other components of the system. Entry into the Atlantic System therefore requires full sharing of the founding values of the cultural and political identity of the current members. It was therefore not enough to have introduced the principles of capitalism and socialism into a society that is substantially foreign to the culture of Renaissance and Enlightenment in order to become an active part of the world's directory of power. The exercise of an active world responsibility requires, on the part of the economic and strategic powers that aspire to play that role, the full sharing on the theoretical level, and the practical application, of the principles of liberal and social democracy.

The ideal candidate, among the present great powers, to join the G7 could be India. It was indeed in India that democracy and federalism were applied for the first time in history to a society fundamentally alien to Western political culture, and profoundly divided on the social, religious, ideological, and ethnic bases. If the test initially failed due to the predominantly external circumstances – the outbreak of the Second World War – the federal principle was eventually applied to British India, giving rise to the first model of democratic and federal government outside Western civilization. From that moment on, India became the historical terrain – in spite of the present illiberal regression – of a worldwide revolution – the universalization of the democratic and federal ideas.

The European constitutional model might have a meaning also for the process of enlargement of the G7. The accession to European institutions has strongly affected the development of democratic constitutionalism, governance capacity, and economic transformation in new Central and Eastern European member states, at least before accession. It has raised difficult issues regarding the relationships between national sovereignty, democracy, and human rights within them. The principle of conditionality – even if applied with discrepancies – in the enlargement process has undoubtedly played a fundamental role in the democratization of Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, European Union accession referendums – held in nine candidate countries, eight post-communist states, and Malta, between March and September 2003 – offer the evidence of the irresistible power of attraction of the European magnet in the process of integration.

Enlargement has not negatively affected the legislative capacity of the European Union; nor has it led to a deterioration of compliance and implementation of European Union law – the initial differentiated integration has quickly returned to normal levels. On the contrary, the accession process has increased the Commission's capacity for intervention, coming to acquire new competences, mainly in those areas in which it was able to direct policy choices with technical tools

such as distribution regulation, or low-key soft ones such as strengthening administrative capacity, cross-border cooperation, and the protection of minorities.

The process of enlargement of the Community/Union has historically had also a direct relationship with the constitutional reforms within the Community/Union itself. The continuous constitutional revisions to the European treaties carried out starting from the signature of the Treaties of Rome, all took place in view or in the perspective of an enlargement. In order to welcome new member states, the six founders and those who have been progressively added have had to change, even deeply, the internal rules and dynamics of their relationships. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that it was precisely the need for enlargement to make the ties between the member states ever closer.

Last but not least, the enlargement process has been the most successful instrument of European Union foreign policy. The Europeanization of Southeast Europe – Greece, Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia – is a major success of European Union foreign policy in the last decade. From being peripheral, European Southeast states have acquired a central role in the process of stabilization of the Balkans, because of the trans-boundary policy consequences which the accession process activated.

The enlargement and the deepening of the Atlantic System – of which the G7 represents the steering nucleus – on the basis of the principle of conditionality – regarding democratic constitutionalism, governance capacity, and economic transformation – would thus produce, on a planetary level, the enlargement of the orbit of democratic government, and prevent the formation of an antagonist system as it was the Soviet one. A simple union of nationalisms cannot in fact be durable or effective because its nature – as we experienced in Europe – is antagonistic and confrontational. On the contrary, the Atlantic System will continue to exercise towards the rest of the world an irresistible power of attraction just because the values on which it is founded became universal. It was precisely the overcoming of nationalism in its historical birth place that gives Europeans the possibility of guiding the process of political integration of humankind.

#### **IV. Aims and implementation of a study-group on the European Constitutional process**

In order to carry out the research project it is proposed to create a study-group on the European Constitutional process, which will bring together distinguished academics (experts on the historical, economic, political, social and juridical aspects of the process of European unification). It aims to stimulate a wide debate within the European Union and have a direct impact on the European constitutional process through a dialogue with members of the European Parliament (being the only assembly directly legitimised by and representing European citizens), policy-makers, and representatives of the European ‘civil society’ (representatives of trade unions, industrialists, the churches, and political movements), to discuss the constitutional character of the evolving European entity.

The competence available within the academic community, notably the Jean Monnet network and the European University Institute, could provide a substantial contribution to the study and debate, through the web and specific activities, to the completion of the European constitutional process and the creation of a true transnational democracy.



The study-group will investigate the vital link between the on-going evolution of a European political entity and its crystallisation in constitutional and democratic processes. The study-group envisages carrying out research on the following main fields:

1. An historical meta-analysis of the main driving forces for European unification;
2. The question of the constituent power, the constitutional form, and the established power;
3. A comparative analysis of federal constitutions and EU institutions;
4. A study of democratic representation and participation and the EU;
5. Evolution of awareness in the citizenry;
6. Evolution and democratic reform of social policy;
7. The role of communication (national media, strategic actions by the EU, citizens' assemblies) in the democratisation of the polity;
8. Common economic policy;
9. Common foreign policy;
10. Common defence policy;
11. Common taxation;
12. Constitutional aspects of a concentric circles Europe;
13. Constitutional and democratic reform of other policy fields, including education, transportation, and communications;
14. Strengthening of the legal instruments for the protection of the rule of law and other common European values;
15. Digitalisation and robotization in future functioning of the EU.

In particular, the study-group will discuss on:

- 1) Previous attempts to establish a European Constitution, and their relevance to the present constitutional process. Comparative studies of federal constitutions and of the plans for a United States of Europe put forward since 1940 would be the starting point. In this investigation, it would be necessary to assess the strengths and weaknesses of such models, including their flexibility and responsiveness and their democratic credentials.
- 2) The differing constitutional and democratic traditions of modern European states, to examine a) the relationship between national traditions and national identities; b) the possibilities for integrating existing national policies within a new European entity; and c) the general principles on which a more democratic constitutional framework for the European Union might be based.
- 3) The conditions for the emergence of a pan-European identity in the citizenry, and of a European political culture in the political class, the relationship with existing national identities and political cultures, and the need of such European identity and political culture for fostering the consent required for establishing a pan-European constitutional authority.
- 4) The problems and possibilities of setting up a permanent democratic constitutional framework for the European Union, and to study the mechanisms for achieving the transition from a nation-based society and state-based politics to one based on supranational issues and democratic norms.

## V. The functioning of the study-group

Membership will be offered to Jean Monnet Chairholders and other distinguished academics throughout the world who have contributed to the study of the history and dynamics of European unification, as well as to other prominent academics, policy and opinion makers. The study group envisages discussing its findings with Members of the European Parliament presently involved in the process of institutional reform of the EU and representatives of the European civil society (industrialists, trade unionists, the churches, political movements, and organizations). The study-group thus aims to promote debate among its members and the public at large on crucial issues for the future of European construction. The accessibility to a dedicated website ([www.constitutionforeuropenetwork.eu](http://www.constitutionforeuropenetwork.eu)) by citizens of non-EU states (particularly those from the Balkans and the Mediterranean) will indirectly connect a large part of public opinion from countries not yet members of the European Union into this debate, offering an inclusive approach to the process of constitutional construction.

Members of the study-group will be asked to produce essays and documents, according to their specialization and competence, on the historical, economic, juridical, political and sociological aspects of the Constitution which the European Union needs to complete the process of European unification.

The publication of the contributions on a dedicated website will offer a substantial contribution to the public debate on the evolution of the present European Union towards a new model of a supranational State, i.e. evaluating the role of the European Parliament as the ‘federator’ of Europe. The proceedings of the study-group aim therefore to help fill the existing gap between the academic community and the European decision-making process.

The procedure of the study-group will follow the successful Chatham House model according to which a select committee will consider papers and documents for publication on the website. All members of the study-group will be asked to provide comments and criticism which will be included in the form of a summary in the final on-line publication. At their meetings held in presence or on-line the members of the study-group will decide on the organization of the group’s work and dissemination of its results. Membership of the study-group will be based exclusively on academic competence and independence of judgment and would not commit members to support any specific institutional framework for the European Union.

The study-group will meet in plenary sessions at least once a year. Its working committees will meet regularly on a definite timetable drawn up by its members.

68 Jean Monnet Professors and other distinguished academics from 17 EU member States (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Greece, Holland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Spain) and 9 non-EU States (Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Brazil, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, USA) have already accepted to be involved in the creation of the study group:

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#### IV. Expected impact of the activities of the study-group

The main intended impact of the group's work is to raise the awareness in the public debate of the desirability, the potential, the difficulties and their possible solutions of building a European polity. Identified target groups (policymakers, diplomats, media exponents, representatives of organized civil society) may draw on the outcome of such a framework of activities. The study group will meet the need of a new understanding of EU politics by producing agreed, collective, and collaborative documents around which to engage policymakers, the media, and civil society at large. Present and future students of the European academic community will be long-term direct beneficiaries of the proposed research activities. In particular, the study-group will endeavour to establish a closer platform of intellectual and operational co-operation between the Jean Monnet Centres of Excellence involved and the European University Institute.

The added value comes from the fact that the study-group will put together a variety of interpretative lines and different scientific approaches to central constitutional themes, as compared to the past. The application of the Chatham House model will contribute to guarantee the scientific character of the project with a maximum degree of balanced academic expertise. The publication of its results on a website will also promote the debate on the future of Europe at large, drawing attention to the constitutional dimension of the evolving European entity.

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